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Abstract
This article shows how the popular press debate over Europe was fundamentally conditioned by the wider political, social, and cultural tensions of early 1960s Britain. By asking how the Daily Express and the Daily Mirror came to represent almost diametrically opposed views on Europe when both reached out to broadly comparable mass readerships, it exposes the many diverse and often contradictory responses that the far-reaching domestic and international transformations of post-war Britain provoked in the public discourse over Europe. Yet, while the Express’s opposition to the British application, based on its conservative and imperialist self-identity, has often been highlighted, the Mirror’s strong support of European integration, as part of its wider agenda for social and cultural change, has been all but ignored. Thus, the article exposes a previously overlooked line of public engagement with Europe at that time: through the eyes of the young, affluent consumer, unmoved by the claims of ‘tradition’. 
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Article
In 1961, the British government’s decision to apply for membership of the European Economic Community [EEC], at the time also known as the ‘Common Market’, triggered a wide-ranging and highly emotive debate about the country’s future relationship with Europe. A question that had previously been of interest mainly to foreign-policy specialists now moved to the forefront of political discourse. Over the following two years, an aggressive and often virulent public debate was stirred up, stretching from the price of food to key questions of national sovereignty. Yet, the domestic dimension of the British application has often been neglected in the emerging historiography.​[1]​ Most diplomatic or international historians include only loose references to public opinion,​[2]​ and more general studies 1960s Britain tend to take public indifference or even hostility for granted.​[3]​ The only recent work concerned with popular attitudes towards Europe, Robert Dewey’s The Anti-Marketeers¸ also focuses exclusively on constructions of anti-European sentiment.​[4]​ By contrast, evidence of significant pro-European sentiment, while sometimes acknowledged, has received no detailed historical treatment thus far.​[5]​ As this article hopes to show, however, the public debate over Europe was significantly more complex, multi-layered, and open-ended than its largely peripheral historiographical treatment might suggest. As the two best-selling newspapers at that time – the Daily Mirror and the Daily Express – both identified ‘Europe’ as a supremely suitable theme to communicate their radically diverging visions of Britain’s past and future, it became deeply intertwined in key political debates, such as Britain’s perceived economic decline and the country’s post-imperial identity. A closer look at the public debate over Europe, then, promises to offer fresh perspectives on a society caught in the paradoxes of unprecedented affluence coinciding with comparative economic decline, struggling to make sense of the far-reaching transformations of the post-war world.
In its attempt to reconstruct parts of this national debate, this article concentrates on the discourses through which most Britons engaged with the European question at that time: those of the popular press. Despite the emergence of television as a politically important medium during the 1950s,​[6]​ the press still maintained historically high circulation figures well into the 1960s. Daily morning newspapers reached over 80 per cent of households in the early 1960s, a higher proportion than in any other country, with just eight national dailies providing for 92 per cent of the 18 million copies sold each day.​[7]​ By offering millions of Britons one of their ‘main windows onto the world’, they still exercised enormous influence on the populace, greatly shaping the country’s political, social, and cultural life.​[8]​ Even Prime Minister Macmillan regularly commented on newspapers like the Daily Express or the Daily Mirror in his diary, sometimes even including circulation figures.​[9]​ A close analysis of popular press discourse therefore promises to reveal the underlying trends, interconnections, and deeper motivations behind the competing narratives of European integration. Yet, this article does not hope to identify any direct or causal press influence in changing popular attitudes towards Europe. Apart from the methodological difficulties involved in such an approach, there is also precious little evidence that the campaigning efforts of either paper exerted a powerful influence on the paper’s readership.​[10]​ Instead, the article’s focus is on how representations of Europe were adjusted to and conditioned by each newspaper’s self-identity and imagined readerships, thereby exposing the wider political and cultural assumptions behind their competing narratives. This approach is based on the assumption that newspapers cannot operate completely detached from market pressures of public opinion. Given the highly competitive nature of the British newspaper market, no paper could afford consistently to alienate significant proportions of its readership, whilst always having to differentiate itself strongly from rivals in both style and politics.​[11]​ As the Daily Mirror’s political adviser, John Beavan, put it in 1962, ‘Fleet Street would take the view that people don’t positively and wilfully buy newspapers which outrage their political opinions’.​[12]​ Looking at how these papers tried to ‘sell’ their views on Europe to their imagined readerships, then, promises to tell us as much about the newspapers’ perceptions of 1960s Britain as it may reveal about attitudes towards the British application itself.​[13]​
The Popular Press in early 1960s Britain
This applies in particular to the competition between the Daily Mirror and the Daily Express, the two undisputed stars of the British newspaper market at that time with a circulation of over 4 million each.​[14]​ Though both tried to appeal to as heterogeneous a readership as possible, their radically different self-identities and political agendas led to significantly different characteristics of each paper. At the Express, proprietor Lord Beaverbrook (1879-1964), born Max Aitken, used the paper largely to further what he regarded as his most important political goal in life, ‘the cause of Empire’.​[15]​ As he wrote to his son in 1962, ‘newspapers like people must have a reason for living. Our reason is and has been the development of Britain by and through overseas associations’.​[16]​ Combined with puritan ethos and moral conservatism, the Express styled itself as the most authoritative, independent voice in the British newspaper market, consciously adopting an aggressive, self-proclaimed identity as the ‘Empire Crusader’. With the 82-year old Beaverbrook still exercising almost complete dominance over his editorial team, violent opposition to the British application was to be expected, as joining a protectionist European bloc seemed completely at odds with the Express’s ideal of Empire Free Trade. As Beaverbrook put it in a personal note to his friend Prime Minister Macmillan, the Common Market ran ‘against the faith of the Daily Express in the Commonwealth, a traditional and ineradicable clause in our creed. As well ask us to repudiate the Presbyterian Church as give up the cause’.​[17]​ Beaverbrook’s views were shared by most of his staff, such as John Junor or Michael Cummings, who were generally eager to please their proprietor.​[18]​ After the final collapse of the EEC negotiations in January 1963, for example, the Express’s correspondent to Brussels reported back ‘in the words that a much more distinguished Alexander wrote to Churchill during the war: “I have carried out the orders you gave me. I now await your further instructions”’.​[19]​ Beaverbrook himself also took active part in the campaign: when Harold Wilson claimed that the Labour Party would oppose the Market unless neutrals were given entry, Beaverbrook immediately suggested to his editors to ‘publish it when he says it again – as no doubt he will’. In handwriting, he added ‘Or employ him to repeat it’.​[20]​ An article by Wilson duly appeared ten days later.​[21]​
The Daily Mirror, on the other hand, had been transformed into a left-leaning working-class tabloid in the 1930s.​[22]​ Having overtaken the Express as the most popular daily in 1949, it remained successful throughout the 1950s and 1960s by attracting primarily ‘young working-class men and women’ with its image as a progressive, modern newspaper.​[23]​ While the significantly younger proprietor, Cecil Harmsworth King (1901-1987), was just as interested as Beaverbrook in using his papers for political ends and later claimed to have personally swung around his papers to support the British application,​[24]​ its campaign for British membership also reflected more widely held editorial beliefs at the Mirror. Editor Hugh Cudlipp, for example, described to the Royal Commission on the Press in 1961 how ‘Mr King thought it was time we began to explain the Common Market to the British public, which I set about doing with enormous zeal, as I am greatly in favour of the Common Market. … I enthuse the editors on this issue, and they also by a happy coincidence are in favour of the Common Market’.​[25]​ Indeed, the editorial team around John Beavan, Sydney Jacobson, and Hugh Cudlipp was almost uniformly in favour of joining the EEC, which may well have been influenced by the fact that they had all served in Europe during the Second World War.​[26]​ Cudlipp, for example, considered Beaverbrook’s ‘Keep-Out-of-Europe capers … a dangerous joke at the expense of history’.​[27]​
This sheds light on an often overlooked generational dynamic in attitudes towards the British application, as younger people were generally seen to be more in favour of European integration. A major opinion poll of the government’s working group on the Common Market, for example, found a majority ‘in favour of joining’ in all age groups under forty-five, and a majority against in all the age groups over forty-five; a National Opinion Poll similarly identified the biggest support for the British application in the age groups of ‘21-24’ and ‘25-34’.​[28]​ Therefore, the European question offered the Mirror an ideal opportunity to emphasize its youthful and progressive image, often consciously defined against the Express. In September 1962, for example, it mocked the Express’s claim to be ‘“the paper that brings you adventure” – one of those breathless adventures being the story of a bridegroom who set off on his honeymoon in a speedboat. Yet the greatest adventure of our time – Britain’s entry into the Common Market – leaves the Daily Express quivering in the sidelines with faint heart, slow pulse and athlete’s foot’.​[29]​ The Mirror, by contrast, was ‘always a winner’, for things were ‘always happening in Britain’s most popular, most buoyant daily newspaper. Bold and provoking ideas … like “Our Neighbours”, the series that tells you all about the people of Europe who may soon be linked with Britain in the Common Market’.​[30]​ As we shall see, these ideas of a generational and societal divide between the Mirror and the Express remained key determinants of the press discourse throughout the application period.
Indeed, the Mirror’s emphasis on youth and progressivism fitted in well with the general political climate of early 1960s Britain. After the Tories had enjoyed eleven years in power, Prime Minister Macmillan had begun to feel a gradual loss of confidence in his government, which was evident not only in opinion polls but also in the rise of a Liberal Party which targeted key sections of the Conservative base: the affluent, progressive middle class.​[31]​ While the Conservative Research Department considered voting Liberal ‘simply a rather more sophisticated variation of not voting at all’, Macmillan personally reflected how the Liberals had ‘a flavour of “something different”’ and therefore illustrated the public’s demands for change.​[32]​ The Labour Party, having recovered from internal divisions over Clause IV and unilateral disarmament, similarly tried to project the image of a young, meritocratic alternative to an out-dated Conservative clique.​[33]​ In this party-political climate, which also stimulated some of the government’s attempts at economic reform and modernization from 1960 onwards,​[34]​ the European application offered Macmillan an ideal opportunity to portray himself and his party as ‘adaptable and flexible, while the rigidity of the Labour Party [was] being emphasized’.​[35]​ This was helped by the general state of public opinion in the early 1960s, which was generally pro-European: a National Opinion Poll in June 1961, for example, found a 3 to 1 majority of the British public supporting a ‘European link up’.​[36]​ In both the national and provincial press, the balance of editorial comment was overwhelmingly in favour of an application, with support ranging from The Times and The Telegraph to The Guardian and The Economist.​[37]​ While this initial enthusiasm somewhat diminished during the course of the Brussels negotiations,​[38]​ the Mirror and the Express retained their unequivocal positions throughout the application period. As we shall see, both papers perceived the European question primarily in the context of broader concerns about Britain’s past and future that were largely independent of the concrete terms obtained at Brussels.
For the Conservatives, then, there was a danger that their European policy alienated traditional supporters, like the Daily Express, while support came from normally virulent opponents, such as the Daily Mirror. At the time, the Mirror’s readership still consisted of over 66 per cent Labour voters, as opposed to only 18 per cent Conservative and 11 per cent Liberal; and while the Express’s split of 48 per cent Conservative to 38 per cent Labour was significantly more bipartisan, Beaverbrook’s close friendship with Macmillan usually ensured the Express’s support of the government.​[39]​ With regard to Europe, however, this led to a curious situation, as Macmillan observed in his diary: the Mirror was ‘pro Common Market but violently anti Government’, whereas the Express remained ‘friendly … except for the Common Market’.​[40]​ After Gaitskell’s famous conference speech against Macmillan’s application in October 1962, for example, the Express enthusiastically proclaimed ‘Gaitskell Day’ and celebrated the ‘one great voice that made Britain think’, whereas the Mirror thought that the Prime Minister was ‘guilty of timidity in a dozen directions, but he will not be ousted by a Labour Party which is timid in the most important direction of all’.​[41]​ Indeed, in his recent TV appearance, though apparently looking ‘like a genial bloodhound, faintly Edwardian and politically musty’, the Mirror thought that Macmillan had at least ‘said the right things and obviously believed in the right things’. Gaitskell, on the other hand, was ‘a good man gone wrong’.​[42]​ Partly to overcome such contradictions, the Express hoped to transform its anti-European campaign into a national movement largely outside the party-political realm, with the array of guest contributors ranging from Field-Marshal Montgomery to the maverick left-wing historian A.J.P. Taylor, a crony of Beaverbrook.​[43]​ In Taylor’s eyes, for example, the application was only symptom of a much wider societal malaise:
Most people in high places worry only about conforming. They run after intellectual fashions, just as smart women are for ever changing the length of their shirts. They have no real beliefs and no real knowledge. Their only desire is to appear progressive, smart, up to date. They are soft on the Germans and hard on the Russians. They are against capital punishment and for the Wolfenden Report. For the Common Market and against the Commonwealth. They do not reason about these things. … They are all for Lady Chatterley’s Lover, which is not much of a book.​[44]​

This illustrates how the European question became intertwined with much wider political and societal conflicts in early 1960s Britain. As we shall see, such interconnections lie at the heart of both economic and political arguments over the application. 

The Economic Dimension of the British Application
Whatever the ultimate reasons for the government’s decision to seek EEC membership,​[45]​ Britain’s comparatively declining export position was surely among the most powerful. Though absolute economic growth remained exceptionally high by historical standards, this was offset by the even higher growth rates of other European economies. Whereas British exports had increased by 29 per cent during the 1950s and early 1960s, France’s 86 per cent or Germany’s 247 per cent seemed rather more impressive.​[46]​ The British economy increasingly became portrayed as underperforming and slipping further behind its rivals, which stimulated heated political debate about British ‘decline’, most evident in popular publications such as Hugh Thomas’s The Establishment (1959), Michael Shank’s The Stagnant Society (1961), or Anthony Sampson’s Anatomy of Britain (1962). Usually written from a centre-left viewpoint, these works found a great variety of scapegoats for Britain’s perceived ‘decline’, identifying diverse structural or cultural weaknesses as its root causes.​[47]​ While most analyses were of little economic value and offered few concrete solutions, they nonetheless occupied a prominent position in the political discourses of early 1960s Britain. They also greatly influenced the Mirror’s approach to the European question.
Given how the emergence of ‘declinism’ in many ways constituted the left’s response to the Conservative’s identification with economic growth and prosperity,​[48]​ it is of little surprise that the Mirror, with its centre-left politics and imagined ‘affluent worker’ readership, eagerly embraced many of its assumptions and arguments. ‘See how the Common Market countries have benefited from their link up’, it cried immediately prior to the application, ‘since 1958, trade between the “Six” has gone up by HALF. Britain’s trade with the “Six” has only increased by a FIFTH’.​[49]​ Contrasting Britain’s alleged stagnation with the perceived dynamism of the EEC countries, the Mirror repeatedly used them as a shining example against which alleged British shortcomings could be projected. British entry alone could stimulate efficiency and competitiveness, two values in which the country was seen to be chronically deficient. Frequently, the Mirror contrasted British ‘amateurism’ with technocratic practices on the Continent, as the country’s ‘out-of-date Victorian rules’ were apparently standing in the way of ‘20th-Century progress’.​[50]​ The Mirror explicitly endorsed centre-left demands for indicative industrial planning and social market policies, especially since the planning system on the Continent was at that time widely regarded as the ultimate cause behind its post-war boom.​[51]​ It greatly praised France, for example, where ‘a force of 4,000 people, headed by an elite of forty top experts, determine the priorities. Targets are set for industries – and the bosses co-operate’.​[52]​ Such examples were sometimes tied to wider debates about industrial relations. In particular, the Mirror professed to be fascinated by the German system of co-determination, where employees routinely occupied roles in the management of a company, a practice that contrasted heavily with Britain’s system of collective bargaining. According to the Mirror, it was vital that Germany’s ‘20th century methods should be studied by the British trade union movement, which today wobbles uneasily on its 19th century foundations’.​[53]​ At a time of great national debate about Britain’s economic future, then, the Mirror deliberately used the European question to promote its own salvations for the country’s perceived malaise.
Yet, the Mirror’s views were by no means universally accepted, least of all by the Daily Express. First, the Express questioned the actual fact of decline. As Britain’s relative decline coincided with a period of unprecedented absolute growth, the Mirror’s claims were relatively easy to ridicule by highlighting short-term variations of long-term patterns: when EEC production rates temporarily stagnated in 1961, for example, the Express immediately pointed out that the USSR’s production rate had grown by 9 per cent during the same time. If economic growth was all that mattered, it joked, ‘we should not join the Common Market – but Russia!’​[54]​ Yet, the Express also attacked the very idea of economic modernization and reform. Rather than praising industrial planning, for example, it professed to greatly fear all the anonymous ‘committees in Europe’, which were composed of ‘grey experts … with brisk, anonymous smiles and neat computer minds’. In the newspaper’s tory-paternalist view, joining the Common Market inevitably meant ‘the ruin of small farms and the closing-down of shipyards’, putting an end ‘to all those small factories … which offer diversity and freedom of choice to our work-people’ and forcing thousands of employees to work in ‘the new giant industries’.​[55]​ The Express therefore countered the Mirror’s endorsement of a new technocratic and meritocratic culture by emphasizing its own traditionalist identity, repeatedly dwelling on the future of Victorian industries like shipbuilding or textiles once inside the Common Market. These sentiments were by no means confined to the political right, and A.J.P. Taylor similarly feared in a guest article that ‘the planners of Brussels will care nothing for the inhabitants of Lancashire, of Tyneside, or of Glasgow. To them these areas are inefficient relics of a bygone age’.​[56]​
These views tied in neatly with the paper’s long-standing sympathies for protectionism. As Beaverbrook put it in a note to his editor, its policy was ‘protectionism wheresoever applied. Wherever we can keep out the foreigner we wish to do so’.​[57]​ In the eyes of the Express, the EEC was designed mainly to convert Britain into a ‘dumping ground’ for the agricultural surpluses of ‘the Six’.​[58]​ Britain’s 6,200 tomato growers, for example, were ‘doomed’, as it would be ‘completely archaic to grow tomatoes in heated greenhouses when they could be grown outdoors in the sun and flown from Italy in a matter of hours’.​[59]​ Neither would the British farmer have any protection against the European Commission’s annual price review, being ‘as much at the mercy of the Common Market bureaucrats as ever he feared he would be’.​[60]​ Similar articles were often targeted for a specific, politically influential Conservative readership, as evident in a Sunday Express review of the historian Arthur Bryant’s book against Common Market entry. The review author took great care to sketch the dimensions of both Bryant’s and the Express’s imagined readerships: ‘If you are driving out into the country today, you will catch sight of some of the quiet but substantial houses in which they live. There will probably be a Rover and a Mini in the drive, a basketful of Corgis yapping in the hall, [and] a notice about the next Tory committee meeting on the hall table’. Many of such ‘solid and influential’ but ‘not very excitable or easily-agitated people’ were now apparently caught by ‘the spectacle of a brilliant man … doing his best during a whole year to appreciate the case for the Common Market, examining all the arguments and – in the end – coming down against them’. According to the Express, ‘farm people everywhere will nod their heads when they read, for example: - “Within a few days, even hours, of the exhaustion of mankind’s accumulated reserves of foodstuffs, every other form of wealth, from diamonds to uranium, would count for nothing in the market compared with food. A millionaire would be ready to trade a Rolls-Royce for a biscuit, a Rembrandt for a glass of milk”’.​[61]​ Thus, we can see how the Express tried to rework the popular appeal of Free Trade in the context of post-war consumerism.​[62]​ Indeed, Dewey has recently shown how both Beaverbrook’s continuing dominance ensured that the unwavering commitment to Empire Free Trade remained central to the Express’s coverage of ‘Europe’, despite its apparent lack of contemporary relevance.​[63]​ This was, of course, not without contradictions. As Taylor later reflected, the political potency of the European issue meant that Beaverbrook ‘ended by transforming his Empire Crusade into a campaign for the protection of British agriculture – surely a paradoxical outcome’.​[64]​ 
Indeed, the Express’s focus on agriculture and Commonwealth trade may have seemed rather remote to an increasing number of Britons. A Gallup poll in September 1961, for example, found that most Britons listed ‘the introduction of more competition into the British industry’ as the ‘greatest’ influence shaping their views on the Common Market, 39 per cent believed that the removal of ‘all subsidies and other protection to industries, like agriculture’ was ‘a good thing’, and another poll a year later even found that only 19 per cent of those polled thought that farmers would actually suffer when joining the EEC.​[65]​ Despite the shaky nature of such polls, given both their methodological imperfections and the highly volatile state of public opinion on Europe, it seems safe to conclude that the ‘declinist’ discourse of the Mirror struck a powerful note amongst some parts of the public, with the Express correspondingly appearing nostalgic ‘for the Britain that had disappeared’.​[66]​ Indeed, the Express itself also became a major ‘declinist’ target: Sampson’s Anatomy of Britain (1962), for example, heavily condemned it for ‘encouraging British complacency and escapism, playing down depressing realities and evoking bygone glories’.​[67]​ The Mirror predictably fell in line. When Prince Philip implicitly argued the case for EEC entry, it joyfully asked: ‘When will the Daily Express – the paper which thinks that the hustling, bustling European Common Market is a deadly threat to Britain – have the courage to come out with the same home truths?’. Time and time again, the Mirror consciously juxtaposed its own support for Europe against the Express’s dwelling ‘in the slumberland of old men’s faded dreams’.​[68]​ 
For the Mirror, the far-reaching transformations in post-war British society, with its increasing affluence and the rise of consumerism, had already come to offer an alternative prism through which to view the world.​[69]​ Even if there was a rise in food prices, for example, the Mirror argued that this would be balanced by ‘lower prices on a wide range of other household goods. For more choice in the shops means more competition for your custom. And – inevitably – lower prices to capture it’.​[70]​ The Mirror claimed that the EEC would generally benefit the consumer. ‘The great idea behind the Common Market’, it mused, ‘is that ultimately member countries will concentrate on the goods they can produce cheapest and best. Just as, in Britain now, Sheffield specialises in steel, the “Five Towns” concentrate on pottery, and Burton brews beer’. In the eyes of the Mirror, this meant that quality would be improved, prices would ‘generally’ come down, and ‘greater prosperity’ would be created – which would inevitably lead to ‘more jobs’.​[71]​ Female readers and young people were often addressed explicitly. ‘ONE IMPORTANT AIM OF THE COMMON MARKET IS EQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN’, a bold sub-heading screamed in June 1961, ‘Already in France, the wages of women workers are, on average, 18s. for every pound paid to men. In Britain, the average woman gets 14s for every pound paid to a man’.​[72]​ In September 1962, the Chairmen of the National Coal Board even claimed in the Mirror that the EEC was primarily about ‘young people wanting to go places’, asking ‘What right have people of my generation to deny them this chance?’ In Germany, as the Mirror eagerly pointed out, everything was ‘splendidly organised [for] young people’, with 600 newly built youth hostels containing 60,000 beds; on French trains, British tourists could get greatly reduced fares on round trips over 750 miles.​[73]​ Most of these arguments, of course, had preciously little to do with the actual issues at stake in the Brussels negotiations. Instead, the Mirror used the European question to sell its own visions of an affluent and meritocratic Britain to its imagined readership. Put in the context of the Express’s traditionalist opposition, we can thus see how economic arguments over joining Europe were adjusted and reworked within the distinctive political climate of early 1960s Britain. 


The wider issues surrounding EEC-membership
Yet, the EEC was not only about economics. At its heart lay the desire for an ‘ever closer’ political union, and signing up to the Treaty of Rome involved abrogating key symbols of national sovereignty. In this context, it is important to note that conflicting visions of Britain’s economic identity often reflected more fundamental differences over Britain’s international identity and its changing role in the post-war world.​[74]​ Traditionally, early 1960s Britain has been portrayed as a country slowly becoming aware of its rapidly declining international power, yet reluctant to embrace its new European role.​[75]​ This certainly applies to the Daily Express, attached as it remained to the cause of Empire and the Commonwealth. For Beaverbrook, fighting the British application offered an opportunity to stand up for these deeply-held beliefs one last time. Not only was it almost exactly half a century since he had first entered politics to back Bonar Law on the issue of Tariff Reform and imperial economic unity,​[76]​ but the European debate also echoed the failure of his Empire Free Trade campaign during the 1930s, a concept he now described as a ‘sort of Common Market of the British Empire’.​[77]​ Thus, the Express saw its campaign in line with its self-proclaimed identity as the ‘Empire Crusader’: 
In 1906 Balfour failed to lend his authority to the principle on which his party had risen to greatness: Protection. He failed also to pursue the other Tory vision of Empire Free Trade. … Today, the Tories, pursuing the phantom of European unity, stand on the threshold of another surrender of principle. They are apparently willing to abandon Britain’s trade defences and to sacrifice the Empire … The shadows of Robert Peel and Arthur Balfour fall across Westminster.​[78]​

These legacies of the past greatly shaped the Express’s campaign against the Common Market, which focused primarily on Empire and Commonwealth sentiment.​[79]​  Rather than getting into the complexities of post-war Commonwealth trade, it sought to gain support by evoking the reader’s emotional identification with the old dominions, based on a shared history and kinship. Its images centred on Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, suggesting a racial community of Britons almost ‘naturally’ opposed to European integration.​[80]​ For Taylor, the ‘fact’ remained that ‘the nations of the Commonwealth are our brothers and sisters, and that foreign countries are not’.​[81]​ Field-Marshal Montgomery even painted an apocalyptic picture of a third world war, in which there could be ‘only one race under Heaven which could stand between the Western World and utter destruction in such a crisis. That is the race to which we belong – the British people … united by close ties of blood, speech and religion the world over. … Let the Mother of Nations gather her children about her in obedience to the call of common kindred; do not let her cast away the affection of her offspring’.​[82]​ Such constructions of an imagined community based on idealised visions of the Empire were inevitably intertwined with memories of the world wars.​[83]​ Unsurprisingly, Monty again served as the most outspoken exponent. ‘Who came instantly to our aid when the crisis burst upon us in 1940, in order to defeat Hitler and all he stood for?’, he asked in July 1962, ‘it was the Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders – our own kith and kin’. Should Britain join the Common Market, the love of these peoples was to be ‘cast away’. He thus called on Britain’s widows, exclaiming that ‘your men whose bodies lie buried in “some corner of a foreign field – That is for ever England” cry out against such a monstrous and infamous act’.​[84]​ 
The Express’s imagined community was consciously juxtaposed against a European ‘other’, as old hostilities were reworked in a post-war context. In light of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, for example, the Express feared that ‘Commonwealth citizens would have less right to enter Britain than people from the countries of the European Common Market’.​[85]​ Even prior to the application’s announcement, Beaverbrook had asked for a ‘better name’ for the Common Market. After suggestions like ‘Common Vortex’, ‘The European Anschluss’, or the ‘Black Pact’,​[86]​ it was finally decided that ‘The European Axis … should serve as a name for your more serious propaganda against the Common Market’.​[87]​ Representations of contemporary Europe were consistently clouded with historical analogies and war-time stereotypes. The notoriously Germanophobe A.J.P. Taylor, for example, reminded readers that ‘one of our war aims was to destroy the Common Market which Hitler had created’, and that the EEC was ‘a way of ensuring that Hitler will win after all’.​[88]​ Monty similarly feared that the British people would find themselves in a Community dominated by ‘a nation which we have knocked hell out of in two world wars’,​[89]​ and one Express editor thought the August Bank Holiday 1962 to be strikingly similar to ‘that ominous, doom-shadowed holiday’ in 1939 – though admitting that there were ‘no gasmasks in cardboard cases left behind on the hallstand’ this time.​[90]​ The lesson seemed obvious to the Express: ‘How disastrous for Britain’, it once cried, ‘to join the Common Market and merge herself with Italy, a country lurching uneasily between Marxism and Fascism!’​[91]​ Again, these views tied in neatly with the Express’s long-standing sympathies for pan-British isolationism under Beaverbrook: it had been an ardent supporter of appeasement in the 1930s and was now advocating an independent nuclear deterrent and the withdrawal of the British Army on the Rhine.​[92]​
Thus, the Express’s discourse fits neatly into the historiographical orthodoxy that Britain’s different wartime experience had stimulated a sense of otherness and detachment from Continental Europe. Weight, for example, argues that British hostility to European integration was caused by a ‘special racial affinity with the people of the Commonwealth’, and Connelly similarly suggests that the Second World War had created ‘a situation that breeds mistrust of all foreigners’.​[93]​ Indeed, a governmental report at the time identified a ‘sort of patriotism (or its negative counterpart, xenophobia)’ as the main motive behind opposition to the British application, reporting fears ‘that we are going to … “surrender our independence to Frogs and Wogs”’ as well as ‘great sensitivity to any suggestions that Britain was abandoning the Commonwealth’.​[94]​ Others, however, were more cautious. The Conservative Research Department, for example, emphasized that ‘the pro-Commonwealth feeling, strong in the House of Commons, is not really very strong in the country’,​[95]​ and a civil servant in the steering group for public opinion thought ‘that the readiness of the country to embark on the political adventure involved in acceptance of the Treaty of Rome is underestimated’.​[96]​ As for the Beaverbrook press, it did ‘not really carry conviction outside their own ranks because they seem to be pushing against history’.​[97]​ Indeed, as Porter or Webster have recently suggested, the country’s transformation from imperial power to post-imperial nation triggered a variety of wide-ranging and often contradictory responses in Britain. While the different wartime experience undoubtedly shaped public attitudes towards Europe significantly, a variety of other influences, such as the Cold War or the emergence of mass tourism, also played a vital part.​[98]​ Indeed, they lay at the heart of the Daily Mirror’s campaign for the British application.
Though we have seen that the Mirror’s support was primarily motivated by concern about Britain’s alleged ‘economic decline’, such notions were deeply intertwined with perceptions of Britain’s absolute international decline.​[99]​ Just as contemporary works like Michael Shanks The Stagnant Society (1961) or John Mander’s Great Britain or Little England? (1963) linked Britain’s perceived economic malaise to a loss of power and influence abroad,​[100]​ so the Mirror sought to evoke support for European integration by arguing that British power was no longer sufficient to independently exert power on the global stage. ‘Little Britain or Great Europe?’, one bold headline provocatively asked, before going on to explain that ‘the days when Britain and the Commonwealth could stand alone as a world force are long past’. It took care to stress the radical transformations of post-war international relations, placing great emphasis on political and commercial differences between the Commonwealth countries. For the Mirror, the family had ‘grown up. Its members speak with different voices. Commonwealth nations pursue their own foreign policies, and design their trading policies to suit their own needs’.​[101]​ It thus called for more limited aims of British foreign policy in light of such long-term international transformations. ‘It is manifestly illusory’, one article claimed, ‘to hope that Britain – this nation of merely 52,000,000 souls, no longer the master of world communications, and two centuries after the Industrial Revolution began – can forever play the genial Rich Uncle. … The pocket is not bottomless and the edges are frayed’.​[102]​ On the eve of the Commonwealth Conference in September 1962, it even addressed the assembled Prime Ministers with an open letter on its front page: Britain, outside the EEC, would become ‘increasingly impotent to influence world affairs. Bereft of the spur of instant competition within the orbit of a resurgent and United Europe. Isolated, as the power of the United States, Russia, and China inexorably expands, from the march of events and from the dominant Common Market spheres developing in the Twentieth Century’.​[103]​ 
Not only does this contrast heavily with the government’s complete refusal to argue along such lines at least until October 1962,​[104]​ but it also shows a surprising degree of readiness to embrace the Community as a vehicle for continued British influence on the international stage, with the EEC being a major force for political stability and economic prosperity in the Cold War framework.​[105]​ Indeed, the Mirror frequently pointed out that the best way of fighting Communism was ‘to raise living standards’ through the Common Market,​[106]​ and greatly praised the EEC’s major achievements of Franco-German reconciliation and a united Western Europe. When de Gaulle famously addressed a crowd of 50,000 cheering Germans with ‘Lang Lebe Deutschland!’ in September 1962, for example, it even devoted a double-page to a picture of his speech, enthusiastically glorifying the dramatic moment ‘when the old enemies buried the hatchet’.​[107]​ The Mirror drew the lesson from this that Britain had to join the EEC in order to secure such achievements. In so doing, it sometimes addressed the Express’s claims directly: ‘Nobody in Britain has forgotten or will forget the Dominion soldiers who fought with us in two world wars; the desire to avert a final calamity arising in Europe is manifestly a major political reason in favour of Britain’s entry’. The choice was between ‘the calamity of a third world war starting in Europe – or a peaceful, united Europe with Britain playing her part’.​[108]​ 
Yet, the Mirror’s different perception of Britain’s place in the world was also closely intertwined with its agenda for political and social change, as it consciously juxtaposed its own support for Europe against the alleged complacency and inwardness of British society. In August 1961, for example, columnist Cassandra mused how the British had always been ‘deeply suspicious about poetry, the decimal system, the Gulf Stream, sex – and the Continent of Europe. Especially the Continent of Europe. … There is no doubt that for many of our more extreme and solid citizens the niggers begin at Calais’.​[109]​ In an attempt to remedy this, the editors sent off ‘a great Mirror team’ to the EEC countries, introducing its readers to ‘Our New Neighbours’. Every week in June 1962, they devoted four pages to one of the EEC’s countries, presenting them as lands of economic progress, social security, upward mobility, and sexual adventure. In the first special, ‘Le Miroir du Jour’, the reader learned that France had only recently been a country ‘where bank notes came apart in your hands but you couldn’t tear the toilet paper. Now she is as jaunty as a fresh-clipped poodle!’ Obviously, the Mirror implied, this was solely due to the virtues of the Common Market, which had been ‘a tremendous spur to France’. Yet, the largest parts of the features were devoted to fashion and sex. Columnist Noel Withcomb explained, for example, that life for the Frenchman was ‘one long courtship … with all the women around him’; and, to please the female reader as well, the 22-year old Parisian secretary Nicole asserted that the Frenchman ‘as a lover’ was ‘passionate, devoted – and unselfish’. The Italian man, on the other hand, was denounced by the Mirror’s Amy Landreth for his ‘philandering’ and ‘calculating, up-and-down-stare’ – though adding that ‘before he turns fat, the typical Italian male is just about the handsomest beast alive’.​[110]​ 
The way in which post-war consumerism also brought with it rapidly changing world-views, however, is most evident in the Mirror’s special on West Germany, which focused almost exclusively on the country’s post-war prosperity and social liberalism. Columnist Noel Withcomb in particular seems to have gone to great lengths to get an impression of the country ‘where beer flows like water, and money flows like beer’. Munich, for him, was ‘like Harrods with streets’ and ‘nearly all the boozers’ looked ‘like the Wembley Stadium’. Accompanied by ‘beefy, suntanned, rosy-cheeked country blondes’ and ‘tough healthy muscled lads’, he even went to a local festival, where ‘everyone jumped on their chairs to sway out a romantic number: “Oh, Wouldn’t it be Wonderful if All the Sea was Beer”’. Withcomb’s praise for Germany sometimes bordered on the outright bizarre or crassly sinister. ‘No Tramps!’, he approvingly noted, ‘I’ve driven hundreds of miles through Southern Germany, but I’ve not seen one tramp or beggar. Hitler exterminated the species. They’ve never come back’. On a lighter note, German girls also featured prominently, as they were the ‘bosomiest in Europe. Average bra size for fraulein is 36 to 38, against 34 to 36 for young British girls. Bra shapes are different, too!’ Germany even seemed fairly liberal: one article noted that children under sixteen were not allowed to stay in pubs after 10pm, closing time being 1am. This must have been astonishing, as parts of Britain were still debating whether to open pubs at all on a Sunday, and everywhere they closed early throughout the week.​[111]​ And so the Mirror’s support for European integration became embedded in its wider agenda for moral and social change.​[112]​ 
Just as the Express’s opposition based on Commonwealth sentiment resonated with some parts of the public, so the Mirror’s readiness to ‘sell Europe’ on the grounds of consumerism and liberal lifestyles struck a note with others. In October 1962, for example, a Gallup poll found that only 13 per cent believed that the Commonwealth would ‘collapse’ if Britain joined the Common Market, whereas 23 per cent thought that the EEC would actually make Britain’s voice ‘more powerful in international affairs’.​[113]​ Many important interest groups, such as the Consumer Association, were also ardent supporters of the British application, with its founder having published the pro-European polemic The Chipped White Cups of Dover in 1960.​[114]​ There was also a strong correlation between popular enthusiasm for Europe and the rise of European travel in post-war Britain: a National Opinion Poll in October 1962 found that ‘almost a quarter of those polled had travelled abroad during the last five years’, the majority of whom now wanted Britain to join the Common Market.​[115]​ Another Gallup Poll claimed that 25 per cent of Britons even described the ‘opportunity to go to a European country and find work’ as ‘an attractive idea’.​[116]​ Clearly, then, the way in which the Mirror linked the society’s post-war ‘Europeanization’ with support for the Common Market illustrates how the press debate over Europe was only part of bigger generational and cultural confrontations in early 1960s Britain.
These dynamics are also evident in the way the Express sought to counter the Mirror’s emphasis on youth and progressivism by transfiguring questions of national sovereignty into a wider generational conflict. Perhaps curiously from today’s perspective, the theme of national sovereignty did not feature at all prominently in either the political or the public debate over Europe at that time.​[117]​ The exception, of course, was the Express, for whom the British application signified nothing less than ‘the end of Britain as a sovereign, self-governing state’.​[118]​ It argued that only an older generation could understand its full implications. ‘It has been fashionable to brush off the sovereignty question as though the whole concept were old-fashioned and out of date’, Oliver Smedley claimed in a guest article, ‘at least that’s what young people at the universities are saying. Some grey-beards think otherwise. Why? Because they have had longer to apply their imagination to history. They have understood and wondered at the gradual evolution of Constitutional Monarchy and Political Democracy, the most original of all British inventions, over a thousand years of history’.​[119]​ A.J.P. Taylor again linked this to his general views on British society: ‘Everywhere one hears the phrases: “We are Europeans.”’, and indeed there were ‘many attractive things in Europe. … The drink is often good, and the cooking adventurous. … This is what Top people mean by culture. They seem to think of the Common Market as a perpetual summer holiday, or as something to provide clever talk in the evenings. It is not. It is a serious political association. Here the position is different. Politically we are not Europeans and never have been’.​[120]​ For the Express, even the Queen seemed in danger, maybe becoming ‘a kind of lesser sub-monarch under an elected European super-President’.​[121]​ The Mirror, by contrast, appeared remarkably unconcerned about sovereignty, as it thought that transferring some powers to the EEC seemed a price worth paying for becoming a ‘leading member of a United Europe, with a population of over 220,000,000 – BIGGER than Russia (212,000,000); BIGGER than America (182,000,000). The most industrious, inventive and politically experienced population in the world’.​[122]​ In its eyes, the Express’s scaremongering about the Queen was ‘utter tripe’: ‘How can the Sunday Express, which claims a “quality” circulation of more than 4,000,000, expect its readers to swallow this kind of hokum?’ For ‘the benefit of the Sunday Express’, the Mirror could reveal ‘exactly what WILL happen to the Queen if Britain joins the Common Market. NOTHING’.​[123]​ 
Yet, the most striking example of how clashing perceptions of British power lay at the heart of demotic political arguments about joining Europe concerns the controversy surrounding the former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s famous claim in December 1962 that Britain had lost an Empire and not yet found a role. For the Express, it seemed final proof that Britain was now ‘just one more little member of Europe’s defence committee’.​[124]​ Already in 1961, it had feared an American takeover of Britain in light of the ‘denigration … at the centre of the campaign to make us crawl for survival into the Common Market’, boasting how ‘the jet engine, the development of television, the first nuclear power station’ all ‘came from our tiny country. … Household names like radar and penicillin – they were products of British genius’.​[125]​ Now, the Express again cried ‘farewell to independence. Farewell to grandeur. …All because they want it that way. The Americans’.​[126]​ For the Mirror, on the other hand, the Acheson controversy merely demonstrated that the Express had ‘got the vapours’.​[127]​ For if the debate forced Britain to ‘a serious stocktaking of our military, economic and moral power’, then this could only be welcomed: though Acheson ‘looked and dressed like Anthony Eden’, he talked ‘more modern sense’, not thinking in ‘terms of abortive Suez campaigns’.​[128]​ Here, the Mirror consciously echoed other contemporary critiques of the British establishment. The satirical television programme That Was The Week That Was, for example, similarly mocked the domestic debate over Acheson’s remarks along similar lines:
Kinnear:	Let Mr Acheson answer this question: How many gold medals did the United States get in the Empire Games? 
Rushton: 	Nonsense! Many of the greatest miracles of modern science stem from Britain. Radar, penicillin, the hovercraft … radar, the steam engine, penicillin, the spinning jenny … radar. And didn’t Britain produce the great transistor valve? 
Frost:	No. But whichever way you look at it, understand this Mr. Acheson: British leadership follows the world!​[129]​ 


Yet, even for the Mirror, joining the EEC did not mean abandoning all claims of great power status, as notions of British leadership were still looming large behind its European visions.​[130]​ After all, it thought that British influence inside the Community would help to guide it ‘in spheres where we excel. … Our influence will depend upon our excellence. Our greatest days, perhaps, are yet to come’. Now this was a comforting thought for readers of a paper which professed to have ‘no delusions of grandeur about the PAST of this great nation. Only reality about this great nation’s FUTURE’.​[131]​
Conclusion
Generational and societal conflicts lay at the heart of the Mirror-Express debate over Europe. At a time of great national uncertainty and far-reaching societal transformations, both newspapers offered particularly bold versions of what they regarded as Britain’s past and future. As a result, such essentially introspective concerns and self-perceptions were projected onto the European question. Whereas the Express based its opposition largely on constructions of ‘Britishness’ and Commonwealth sentiment, the Mirror in turn linked its support for Europe to popular discourses over British ‘decline’, thereby embedding the question in a wider agenda for moral and social change. While there has sometimes been a teleological tendency to regard British indifference or hostility towards European integration as a seemingly fixed and eternal constant in the country’s political culture,​[132]​ the findings presented in this article instead highlight the need to situate popular attitudes towards Europe within their particular historical circumstances. Looking at the enthusiasm displayed by the Daily Mirror, for example, it seems tempting to conclude that the domestic bickering so often associated with the British application may have been more due to the government’s own half-heartedness than to the alleged constraints of public opinion.​[133]​ While it is obviously beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the interrelations of elite, press, and popular opinion, the press debate nonetheless suggests that the Macmillan government’s complete refusal to embark upon a high-profile public relations campaign for the application until at least September 1962 clearly deserves more detailed examination.
On another level, however, the Mirror-Express debate over Europe also offers historians a unique window into the popular politics of early 1960s Britain, given how it became deeply intertwined with many of the wider political, social, and cultural conflicts at that time. The economic arguments over the application, for example, go a long way to expose the traditionalist-progressive tensions at the heart of Britain’s ‘technocratic moment’.​[134]​ While the Mirror’s call for reform through increased competition and indicative planning inside the EEC clearly illustrates widespread ‘declinist’ demands for technocratic and meritocratic change, to some extent paving the way for Wilson’s ‘White Heat’ rhetoric in 1963-4, the Express’s hostile opposition also exposes some of the difficulties faced by the Conservative’s ‘modernization’ agenda, of which the EEC-application was an integral part. As Macmillan wrote to his Minister of Transport in 1962, ‘while we must not hesitate from the slogan “Growth means change – innovation and change are all the time necessary”, yet we must not let it be thought that so far as men and women are concerned they are to be treated in the Victorian happy-go-lucky way when they thought of humans almost less than they thought of machines’.​[135]​ As we have seen, it was exactly on these grounds that the Express sought to stimulate opposition to the British application, scaremongering about ‘bureaucrats’ and ‘computer minds’ on the Continent. 









^1	  Important but dated exceptions are R.J. Lieber, British Politics and European Unity: Parties, Elites, and Pressure Groups (London, 1970), J. Moon, European Integration in British Politics 1950-63: A Study of Issue Change (Aldershot, 1985), and R. Jowell and G. Hoinville, Britain into Europe: Public Opinion and the EEC, 1961-75 (London, 1976). M.A. Tawil, ‘British Government and press perceptions of and policy preferences for European integration during the Macmillan years’, PhD thesis, University of London, 2005 is largely concerned with governmental steering of the press. Some of the essays in D. Baker and D. Seawright, eds, Britain For and Against Europe: British Politics and the Question of European Integration (Oxford, 1998) and A. May, ed., Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe: The Commonwealth and Britain’s Applications to join the European Communities (Basingstoke, 2001) also touch on the first application. 
^2	  S. George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, 3rd Edition (Oxford, 1998), 275; H. Young, This Blessed Plot:  Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (New York, 1998), 129-30; J.W. Young, Britain and European Unity, 2nd Edition (Basingstoke, 2000), 80; W. Kaiser, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945-63 (Basingstoke, 1996), 150. More detail is offered in N.P. Ludlow, Dealing with Britain: The Six and the first UK application to the EEC (Cambridge, 1997), 88, 93, 172, 250-1. 
^3	  D. Sandbrook, Never Had It So Good: A History of Britain from Suez to the Beatles (London, 2005), 531; R. Weight, Patriots: National Identity in Britain 1940 – 2000 (Basingstoke, 2002), 334-8; P. Hennessy, Having It So Good: Britain in the Fifties (London, 2007), 617-18. For a more balanced view, see B. Harrison, Seeking A Role: The United Kingdom, 1951-1970 (Oxford, 2009), 116-18.
^4	  R.F. Dewey Jr., British National Identity and Opposition to Membership of Europe, 1961-63: The Anti-Marketeers (Manchester, 2009), 5, 7. 
^5	  The exception is G.R. Wilkes ‘British attitudes to the European Economic Community, 1956-63’, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 2002. Yet, the analysis rarely goes beyond the attitudes of allegedly opinion-forming elites.
^6	  For the political role of television at that time, see J. Lawrence, Electing Our Masters The Hustings in British Politics From Hogarth To Blair (Oxford, 2009), 162-70.
^7	  D. Butler and D. Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice, 2nd Edition (Basingstoke, 1974), 115-6.
^8	  A. Bingham, Family Newspapers? Sex, Private Life, and the British Popular Press 1918-1978 (Oxford, 2009), 263.
^9	  Diary entry for 6 February 1962, in P. Catterall , ed., The Macmillan Diaries, Vol.II: Prime Minister and After, 1957-1966 (Basingstoke, 2011), 447; also H. Evans, Downing Street Diary: The Macmillan Years 1957-1963 (London, 1981), 54.
^10	  Already recognised at the time by the Mirror’s political advisor Beavan. J. Beavan, The Press and the Public (London, 1962), 12-13. 
^11	  Butler and Stokes, Political Change, 115-16.
^12	  Beavan, Press and Public, 9. 
^13	  This methodological approach is largely based on Bingham, Family Newspapers, 2-28.
^14	  C. Seymour-Ure, The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945, 2nd Edition (Oxford, 1996), 28-9. Their closest rival, the Daily Mail, only managed 2.8  million.
^15	  Sunday Express, 5 May 1962. 
^16	  House of Lords (London), Beaverbrook Papers [henceforward: BBK]/H/221, Lord Beaverbrook to Max Aitken, 24 August 1962. 
^17	  BBK/C/235, Beaverbrook to Macmillan, 28 November 1961. 
^18	  Dewey, Anti-Marketeers, 45-8.
^19	  BBK/H/229, Kenworthy to Beaverbrook, 31 January 1963. 
^20	  BBK/H/220, Beaverbrook to Junor, 31 May 1962.
^21	  Sunday Express, 10 June 1962.
^22	  M. Pugh, ‘The Daily Mirror and the Revival of Labour 1945-1945’, Twentieth Century British History, 9/3 (1998), 420-38.
^23	  C.H. King, Strictly Personal: Some Memoirs of Cecil H. King (London, 1969), 101. 
^24	  Ibid., 199.
^25	  H. Cudlipp, Walking on the Water, (London,1976), 224. The Royal Commission had been set up to investigate the Mirror Group’s recent takeover of the Odham Group.
^26	  Wilkes, ‘British Attitudes’, 422-3.
^27	  Cudlipp, Walking, 288.
^28	  The National Archives (Kew), Public Record Office [henceforward: TNA:PRO]/PREM11/4415, ‘Public Opinion and the Common Market’, 18 September 1962; Daily Mail, 5 October 1962. The Daily Mail regularly printed factual opinion polls on behalf of National Opinion Polls [NOP].
^29	  Daily Mirror, 4 September 1962. Emphasis in original.
^30	  Daily Mirror, 7 July 1962.
^31	  Often connected to the ‘myth of Orpington’. See K. Young, ‘Orpington and the Liberal Revival’, in C.Cook and J. Ramsden , eds, By-Elections in British Politics (London, 1997), 157-79.
^32	  Bodleian Library (Oxford), Conservative Research Department Files [henceforward: CRD]/2/21/6, ‘Psephology Report Reviewed’, 10 April 1963; Diary entry for 24 March 1962, in Catterall, Macmillan Diaries, 460.
^33	  M. Collins, ‘The Fall of the English Gentleman: The National Character in Decline, c.1918-1970’, Historical Research, 75/187 (February 2002), 105.
^34	  J. Ramsden, The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath, 1957-75 (London, 1996), 129-79; J. Tomlinson, ‘Conservative Modernization, 1960-64: too little, too late?’, Contemporary British History, 11/3 (1997), 18-38.
^35	  Bodleian Library (Oxford), Macmillan papers [henceforward: MCC]/c.331, Macmillan to Redmayne, 5 August 1961. 
^36	  TNA:PRO/T243/23, ‘Record of Meeting’, 19 June 1961; Daily Mail, 5 June 1961.
^37	  G.R. Wilkes and D. Wring, ‘The British Press and European Integration: 1948 to 1996’ in D. Baker and D. Seawright, eds, Britain For and Against Europe: British Politics and the Question of European Integration (Oxford, 1998), 189-91.
^38	  Ibid., 190-2.
^39	  Butler and Stokes, Political Change, 116.
^40	  10 September 1962 and 1 June 1962, in Catterall, Macmillan Diaries, 495, 474. Emphases in original.
^41	  Daily Express, 4 and 5 October 1962; Daily Mirror, 12 October 1962. 
^42	  Daily Mirror, 21 September and 4 October 1962. 
^43	  For Taylor’s role as Sunday Express columnist from October 1957 to 1982, see K. Burk, Troublemaker: The Life and History of A.J.P. Taylor (New Haven and London, 2000), 400-7.
^44	  Sunday Express, 27 May 1962.
^45	  See J. Ellison, ‘Accepting the Inevitable: Britain and European Integration’, in W. Kaiser and G. Staerck, eds, British Foreign Policy 1955-64: Contracting Options (Basingstoke, 2000), 171-90. 
^46	  Sandbrook, Never Had It So Good, 522.
^47	  J. Tomlinson, The Politics of Decline: Understanding Post-War Britain (Harlow, 2001) offers the most extensive interpretation of ‘declinism’, read as an ideology. See also G. Ortolano, The Two Cultures Controversy: Science, Literature and Cultural Politics in Postwar Britain (Cambridge, 200), 12-16, and A. Gamble, ‘Theories and Explanations of British Decline’, in R. English and M. Kenny, eds, Rethinking British Decline (Basingstoke, 2000), 1-22. The influence of such ideas at that time is well illustrated by the contemporary discussion in D.E. Butler and A. King, The British General Election of 1964 (Basingstoke, 1964 [1999], 33-6.
^48	  Tomlinson, Politics of Decline, 33.
^49	  Daily Mirror, 29 June 1961. 
^50	  Daily Mirror, 16 April 1962. 
^51	  Tomlinson, Politics of Decline, 19. 
^52	  Daily Mirror, 25 June 1962.
^53	  Daily Mirror, 29 August 1961. 
^54	  Daily Express, 24 January 1962.
^55	  Sunday Express, 4 March 1962. 
^56	  Sunday Express, 2 December 1962. 
^57	  BBK/H/225, Beaverbrook to Pickering, 12 March 1962. 
^58	  Daily Express, 11 December 1961. 
^59	  Daily Express, 12 May 1962.
^60	  Sunday Express, 22 July 1962.
^61	  Sunday Express, 19 August 1962.
^62	  For the rise and fall of popular attachment to Free Trade, see F. Trentmann, Free Trade Nation. Commerce, Consumption, and Civil Society in Modern Britain (Oxford, 2008). 
^63	  Dewey, Anti-Marketeers, 74-7.
^64	  A.J.P. Taylor, Beaverbrook (London, 1972), xiv. 
^65	  Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., ‘British Attitudes to the EEC 1960-63’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 5/1 (1966), 54, 56, 60. 
^66	  Bingham, Family Newspapers, 123.
^67	  A. Sampson, Anatomy of Britain (London, 1962), 122.
^68	  Daily Mirror, 21 March 1962, 12 April 1962, 17 December 1962.
^69	  L. Black, The Political Culture of the Left in Affluent Britain, 1951-64: Old Labour, New Britain? (Basingstoke, 2003), 1-11; L. Black, Redefining British Politics: Culture, Consumerism and Participation, 1954-70 (Basingstoke, 2010) ,8.
^70	  Daily Mirror, 28 June 1961.
^71	  Daily Mirror, 27 June 1961.
^72	  Daily Mirror, 27 June 1961. Emphasis in original.
^73	  Daily Mirror, 10 September, 9 July and 25 June 1962.
^74	  Gamble, ‘British Decline’, 3-4.
^75	  Harrison, Seeking a Role, 540.
^76	  A. Chisholm and M. Davie, Beaverbrook: A Life (London, 1992), 517-8.
^77	  Sunday Express, 11 February 1962.
^78	  Daily Express, 8 May 1962.
^79	  Dewey, Anti-Marketeers, 62-77.
^80	  For discussions about ‘British race patriotism’ and popular attitudes towards the end of Empire, see for example S. Ward, British Culture and the End of Empire (Manchester, 2001), 1-20; and W. Webster, Englishness and Empire, 1939-1965 (Oxford, 2005), esp. 11-17; 172-181. For the making of this ethnic-economic world order, see J. Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939 (Oxford, 2009). 
^81	  Sunday Express, 3 December 1961.
^82	  Sunday Express, 3 June 1962.
^83	  Dewey, Anti-Marketeers, 62-9.
^84	  Sunday Express, 1 July 1962. 
^85	  Daily Express, 16 November 1962.
^86	  BBK/H/218, ‘Pincher to Beaverbrook’, 14 June 1961; ‘Thomson to Beaverbrook’, 19 July 1961.
^87	  BBK/H/218, ‘Pincher to Beaverbrook’, 21 June 1961.
^88	  Sunday Express, 2 July 1961.
^89	  Sunday Express, 1 July 1962.
^90	  Sunday Express, 5 August 1962. 
^91	  Daily Express, 14 February 1962.
^92	  Dewey, Anti-Marketeers, 62.
^93	  Weight, Patriots, 334; M. Connelly, We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the Second World War (Harlow, 2004), 280.
^94	  TNA:PRO/PREM11/4415, ‘Public Opinion and the Common Market’, 18 September 1962.
^95	  CRD/2/42/8, ‘Electoral Aspects of Tory Policy’, 15 March 1962. 
^96	  TNA:PRO/T245/25, ‘Moore to Raphael’, 3 April 1962. 
^97	  TNA:PRO/T/245/24, ‘Raphael to Higgins’, 22 January 1962.
^98	  Webster, Englishness and Empire, 175; B. Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford, 2004 [2007]), 301; W. Webster, ‘From Nazi  Legacy to Cold War: British perceptions of European Identity, 1945-54’, in M. Spiering and M. Wintle, eds, European Identity and the Second World War (Basingstoke, 2011), 108. 
^99	  Gamble, ‘British Decline’, 3-4.
^100	  M. Shank, The Stagnant Society: A Warning (London, 1961); J. Mander, Great Britain or Little England? (London, 1963).
^101	  Daily Mirror, 30 June 1961.
^102	  Daily Mirror, 13 September 1962. 
^103	  Daily Mirror, 11 September 1962.
^104	  N.P. Ludlow, ‘A Mismanaged Application: Britain and the EEC, 1961-1963’, in A. Deighton and A. Milward , eds, Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957-1963 (Baden-Baden, 1999), 278-9.
^105	  For relationship of European integration and the Cold War, see N.P. Ludlow, ‘European integration and the Cold War’, in M.P. Leffler and O.A. Westad, eds, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol.2: Crises and Détente (Cambridge, 2010), 179-97;  and T. Garton Ash, ‘Why Britain is in Europe: The Ben Pimlott Memorial Lecture’, Twentieth Century British History, 17/4  (2006), 459.
^106	  Daily Mirror, 30 June 1961.
^107	  Daily Mirror, 6 September 1962.
^108	  Daily Mirror, 11 September 1962.
^109	  Daily Mirror, 2 August 1961. 
^110	  Daily Mirror, 25 June and 2 July 1962.
^111	  Daily Mirror, 9 July 1962. 
^112	  For the Mirror’s role, see Bingham, Family Newspapers, 266.
^113	  Gallup, ‘British Attitudes’, 51.
^114	  M. Young, The Chipped White Cups of Dover: A Discussion of the Possibility of a New Progressive Party (London, 1960). See also Black, Redefining British Politics, 17.
^115	  Daily Mail, 5 October 1962.
^116	  Gallup, ‘British Attitudes’, 52.
^117	  See Young, Blessed Plot, 125-6.
^118	  Sunday Express, 30 July 1961.
^119	  Sunday Express, 25 February 1962.
^120	  Sunday Express, 21 October 1962.
^121	  Sunday Express, 10 September 1961.
^122	  Daily Mirror, 30 June 1961.
^123	  Daily Mirror, 11 September 1961.
^124	  Sunday Express, 16 December 1962
^125	  Sunday Express, 13 August 1961.
^126	 ; Daily Express, 7 December 1962.
^127	  Daily Mirror, 7 December 1962.
^128	  Daily Mirror, 7 December and 10 December 1962.
^129	  Quoted in S. Ward, ‘No Nation Could Be Broker’, in S. Ward, ed., British Culture and the End of Empire (Manchester, 2001), 101-2. See also Collins, ‘English Gentleman’, 102-3.
^130	  T. Garton Ash, ‘Why Britain is in Europe’, 460.
^131	  Daily Mirror, 7 December 1962 and 17 December 1962. 
^132	  Hugo Young, for example, talks about ‘the story of fifty years in which Britain struggled to reconcile the past she could not forget with the future she could not avoid’. Young, Blessed Plot, 1.
^133	  For criticism of Macmillan’s handling of public relations over the application, see Ludlow, ‘Mismanaged Application’, 278-82.
^134	  Ramsden, Winds of Change, 129-79; D. Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970 (Cambridge, 2006), 191-202; and Ortolano, Two Cultures Controversy, 12-27.
^135	  Quoted in Ramsden, Winds of Change, 179.
^136	  For the decline of ‘puritan’ creed, see M. Grimley, ‘The Religion of Englishness: Puritanism, Providentialism, and “National Character,” 1918–1945’, The Journal of British Studies, 46/4 (October 2007), 905-6; for the Mirror, Bingham, Family Newspapers, 264-6.
